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Vol. IX

NOVEMBER, 1931

No. I

MEMBERS OF THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION:
HIS issue of the Dicta is published under the direction
of the newly appointed Editorial Board. The board
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mr. John
Pierce, former Editor-in-Chief, and his suggestions for betterment of Dicta. Mr. C. Clyde Barker and Mr. B. C. Hilliard,
Jr., will continue as editors respectively of "Supreme Court
Decisions" and "Dictaphun". Mr. Dayton Denious will continue in charge of trial court decisions. Mr. Fred Y. Holland
will assume charge of a new Historical department of Dicta.
In this issue will be found the first efforts of this department
embodying a sketch of the life of the early Colorado courts
and judges. Mr. Roy 0. Samson and Noah A. Atler will
serve in the capacity of associate editors.
The Dicta will hereafter contain an editorial page under
the title of "Dicta Observes". Items of interest will be noted,
recommendations will be urged and suggestions made. It is
believed that this new department will add to the diversification of the publication.
The Dicta in the past has established an enviable reputation. Mr. Fred Y. Holland now a member of the Dicta staff
and Librarian of the Supreme Court, who recently returned
from the East, reports extremely favorable comment upon the
publication. It depends however for material upon its members, and therefore urges them to support Dicta by preparing
for publication articles of interest to the Bar. A little effort
by the members of the Bar will increase the value of Dicta
materially.
The Board will appreciate comments upon any articles
published or any suggestions for betterment of the publication.
Respectfully,
THE DICrA EDITORIAL BOARD.

Louis A. Hellerstein,
Editor-in-Chief.
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+ + + Dicta Observes

COLORADO BAR

No. 12

+ +

I

ASSOCIATION MEETS

The annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association was
held at Colorado Springs on September 16 and 17, 1932. A
former president of the Denver Bar Association, Ernest L.
Rhoads, was unanimously elected to serve as President of the
Colorado Bar during the ensuing year. The meeting amply
repaid those who attended.

JUSTICE JOHN CAMPBELL

In recognition of 34 years of service on the Colorado
Bench, the Bar joined -together -in eulogy of Justice John
Campbell at the meeting of the Colorado Association. Judge
Campbell has been an honored member of the bar and justly
deserves the recognition tendered him.

PRESS AND THE LAW

Lee Taylor Casey, of the Rocky Mountain News, addressed the Colorado Bar Association upon the above subject.
He stated that differences arise between the bar and the press
because each desires by different methods to exert efforts to
obtain reforms. He urged that a committee of the association
cooperate with the press to keep relations harmonious for all
concerned.
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ORAL ARGUMENT

Horace W. Hawkins, of Denver, ably presented the above
subject. The topic was especially chosen to enlighten younger
members of the bar who might be faced with the problem of
the proper and most effective manner of presenting an oral
argument. A thorough knowledge of the facts involved in
the case was deemed of especial importance.

BAR EXAMINATIONS

A symposium upon the above subject was presented by
Dean R. H. Wolcott of Denver Law School, Dean H. J.
Barry of Westminster Law School and Dean R. L. Stearns of
Colorado Law School. Dean Wolcott traced the expansion
and growth of law schools from 61 in 1889 to 181 in 1929 and
the increased number of law students. He stated that the
raising of the standards of the bar was invoked because the
public demanded for its protection fewer and better lawyers.
Dean Barry deplored the fact that many bar examinations
covered specialized fields and practical problems which no
Law School attempted or could teach in its curricula. He
also recommended that after the examinations are taken by
students, they be promptly advised of the results. Dean
Stearns spoke upon the subject of "Character Examinations".
He stated that present methods of obtaining character information was being improved and that to inculcate ideals and
legal ethics in the minds of the students, the same should be
encouraged and taught in the Law Schools. The Junior Bar
plan was also suggested as a means of character building for
students desiring to enter the profession.

NOTICES

Dicta is pleased to publish notices of interest to the Bar,
such as formation of new law firms, dissolutions of law partnerships, or removal of law offices and items of a similar
nature, when submitted to it.

EFFECT ON LEASE OF BANKRUPTCY
OF TENANT
By Edwin J. Wittelshofer, of the Denver Bar
N time of prosperous business activity the desire to obtain
a solvent tenant and the hurried scramble for a profitable
location seems to preclude, to a large extent, consideration
by both landlord and tenant of terms and obligations of a lease
except as to duration of the term and amount of monthly
rental. This day of economic difficulties, however, has proved
that it is a wise landlord who knows his own lease and a
prudent tenant who consults his lawyer in its preparation.
The decisions of our courts make it plain that much of
the commonly accepted information, especially among laymen, concerning obligations and liabilities under leases, is
erroneous. To call attention to a few of these liabilities and
obligations in case of bankruptcy of the tenant is the purpose
of this paper.
If there is no provision in a lease regarding bankruptcy
of the tenant, by that contingency itself the lease passes by
operation of law to the trustee in bankruptcy subject to his
right to reject it, and he must within a reasonable time after
his appointment elect to accept or reject it. In event of election to accept the lease, title thereto relates back to date of
adjudication, but in event of rejection, as most often proves
the case, the lease remains the property of the tenant, and the
tenant, notwithstanding his adjudication nor even his discharge, remains liable to the landlord for the obligations and
claims not provable against the bankrupt estate.
Rents, taxes and insurance due the landlord under the
lease at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy are
claims provable against the bankrupt estate, but sums not due
are not provable and the tenant is not discharged for rent and
other obligations accruing subsequent to the filing of the
petition.
Judge Sanborn of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals, in the case of WJVatson v. Merrill, 69 L. R. A. 719
(136 Fed. 273) says:
"One agrees to pay monthly rents . . . for his place of business . . .
he becomes insolvent and is adjudicated a bankrupt. His obligations and
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liabilities are neither terminated nor released by the adjudication. He still
remains legally bound to pay the rent . . . notwithstanding the fact that his
insolvency may render him unable immediately to do so."

The landlord, however, may dispossess the tenant for nonpayment of rent, but he cannot dispossess the receiver or trustee
who is entitled to remain in possession of the premises for a
reasonable time and the bankrupt estate is liable for the reasonable value for the use and occupation thereof during such time.
This reasonable value, as a matter of practice, is usually fixed
by the rent which the tenant agreed to pay. If the bankrupt
has paid rent in advance of the date of his adjudication, the
receiver or trustee is not liable for rent during the time for
which the bankrupt has paid in advance. As often happens,
where a deposit has been made by the tenant to secure the
performance of a lease, the receiver or trustee cannot set off
rent of the premises which he occupies where the tenant is
liable for any deficiency until termination of the lease, the
landlord being entitled to hold tenant's deposit if the lease so
provides notwithstanding bankruptcy. But where the lease
provides for its termination at the option of the landlord, upon
filing petition in bankruptcy, and the landlord takes possession
of the premises and terminates the tenancy the trustee may
offset rent due at the time of filing the petition and also for
use and occupancy by the trustee. Landlords have often attempted, by provision in the lease, to reach the entire deposit
made under the lease as liquidated damages or to make all
future instalments of rent, in case of bankruptcy, at once due
and payable but courts have not much aided such attempts.
A case in point well illustrating this attitude is In Re
Scholtz-Mutual Drug Co., 298 Fed. 540, wherein the lease
provided termination in case of bankruptcy and "upon such
termination all future instalments of rent unpaid ... shall at
once become due and payable." This clause the court held
a penalty against which a court of equity should give relief.
Again in Kothe v. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224, a lease
providing termination upon filing of petition in bankruptcy
and that "the lessor shall forthwith upon such termination be
entitled to recover damages for such breach in an amount
equal to the amount of the rent reserved in this lease for the
residue of the term thereof", the court considering the time
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which the lease had yet to run (2 years) held to enforce such
a provision was to defeat the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.
Even where the lease becomes terminable on the bankruptcy of tenant it is not terminated without an entry by landlord for the purpose of repossession. If the lease is executed
by several tenants the bankruptcy of one does not breach the
lease, and in case a third party guarantees the lease the filing
of a petition in bankruptcy against the tenant does not discharge such guarantor.

CHANGES IN COURT RULES*
RULE XXI
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS

SECTION 1. A bill of exceptions may be tendered to the
judge or clerk; if to the clerk he shall note thereon the tender
and without delay lay it before the judge. The judge shall
then and there fix a time, to follow notice by the clerk of the
tender, within which the opponent may file written objections
to the bill, and if none is filed within that time he shall settle
and sign it. If such objection is filed the exceptor shall be
immediately notified and the objection shall be heard and the
bill settled and signed with all convenient speed. (Same as
Rule 10, Supreme Court.) Unless otherwise ordered by the
court the opponent shall have fourteen days after date of
notice of lodgment within which to file written objections to
the bill.
SECTION 2. The time ordered for the filing of objections
may be extended upon good cause shown, after notice to the
opposite party, provided application is made therefor within
the period of time allowed.
SECTION 3. Bills of exception shall not be -removed from
the office of the clerk without order of court upon notice to
the opponent.
(Sec. 4 omitted because covered by Supreme Court rule
in Section 1.)
*The foregoing was adopted by Judges of the District Court of Denver at the
opening of the September Term of Court.

THE LAWYERS' TOOL CHEST
By Fred Y. Holland,Librarian,Supreme Court Library*
HE enormous and constantly increasing number of law
books presents a problem which should receive the
prompt and careful consideration of the Bench and
Bar. This increase involves a growing expense to the lawyer,
and almost interminable labor in exhaustive research.
The multiplicity of the implements of the legal profession, and how the enormous expense and labor involved may
be reduced, is not a new problem confronting the Bar. In
Bacon's time, when the printed reports and statutes of England
had grown to. the "unbelievable extent of 50 or 60 volumes",
the evil was so great, in his opinion, as to require a recompiling of the common law. It is stated in "Hoffman's Legal
Study", published at Baltimore, in 1838, that "the increase in
this portion of our literature within the last 30 years has no
parallel in the judicial history of any other country. More
than 450 volumes of American law books now load our
shelves, and the number of British books of reports is equally
extensive."
Consider then, by comparison, the fact that the accumulation of law books in the law division of the Library of Congress in 1931, reached a grand total of 260,000 volumes, and
that the number accessioned, in the fiscal year of 1930-31,
numbered over 20,000 volumes. Complaint was made to Congress that the library was by no means complete, and thereupon an additional appropriation of $50,000 per annum was
made with which to buy books.
The law library of Harvard University is the most extensive and complete in the United States. It contains over
340,000 volumes, and has a staff of 52 employees. The Bar
Association Library of the City of New York lists 181,194
volumes and maintains a staff of 33 employees. The average
state owned library, of which your Supreme Court Library is
one, contains about 50,000 books, periodicals and pamphlets.
The normal increase of an average library is about 600 volumes per year, and it is generally operated by a staff of five
*A paper presented to the Law Club.
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persons, namely, a librarian, two assistant librarians, a cataloguer and stenographer.
The matter of the increasing number of court reports
engaged the attention of the American Bar Association as
early as 1884. In a speech before the Association that year,
(Reports, Am. Bar, Vol. 7, P. 224) Mr. John F. Dillon estimated the number of judicial reports at 3,000 volumes, and
stated that they were growing at the enormous rate of 100
volumes per year and that the problem presented was of serious and pressing moment. In 1894, (Reports Am. Bar, Vol.
17, P. 72) the President of the American Bar Association appointed a special committee to look into the matter of law
reporting throughout the Union, with the view of reducing
the number of reports and greatly decreasing the expense.
The following year that committee rendered its report and
said, "the increase in the number of reports is, upon the whole,
by far the most serious aspect of the question in hand. It is
also the problem the most difficult of solution since the causes
are deep seated and irremovable, being connected with the
foundation of our system of law and government." It was
suggested, "that fewer cases should be reported, withholding
from publication opinions which have no importance in explaining or developing the law; that state reports should contain only decisions of courts of last resort, except possibly the
opinions of courts of state-wide jurisdiction, and that unnecessary duplication of the same matter in different series of reports should be avoided." Little, if anything, resulted from
these suggestions, and up to the present time, no appreciable
progress has been made towards solving the problem.
The question confronting the American Bar Association
at that time is fundamentally the same today, but its importance has increased many fold on account of the vast multiplicity of books published in recent years. The paramount
objection today, in my opinion, is the expensive and unnecessary duplication within each class of books.
To illustrate, is it necessary that there be three different
and distinct editions of the United States Supreme Court reports; namely, the official "United States Reports," the "Supreme Court Reporter," the "Lawyer's Edition" and printed
advance sheets for each? I desire to say here that I do not
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under-estimate the value and the attractive features of any one
of the three. Each has certain exclusive and desirable
qualities.
It is true that the law, in keeping with the progress of the
times, is constantly expanding and embracing new fields of
activity; for instance, several new volumes of statutes, reports
and treatises have recently been published on the subject of
air-law, both radio and aeronautics, and hundreds of volumes
are now devoted to the subjects of Automobile Law, Workmen's Compensation, Prohibition, and Woman Suffrage.
Law books may be divided into two general classes: First,
those published officially and which are the repositories of
the law; namely, constitutions, treaties, statutes and the reports of courts of last resort. These publications, being the
tangible evidence of the law, are essential to any complete law
library. Second, unofficial and private publications; namely,
books that explain and expound the law; and the search-books
that aid the lawyer by directing him to the places where he
may find the law.
The Bible furnishes an interesting account of one of the
earliest published statutes. It is related in the Book of Exodus, Chapter 20, that about the year 1491 B. C., Moses was
called to the top of Mt. Sinai, and there was delivered unto
him two tablets of stone upon which were written the laws
to govern the children of Israel, with full instructions as to
their care and execution. (What a "find" those stones would
be for some modern bibliophile.) If those stones turned up
today they would no doubt be republished in at least a dozen
different editions and forms, including an annotated one with
pocket supplements. The price would depend entirely on
the importance of the laws to the profession, the necessity of
acquisition, and the location of the publisher: For example,
if published locally, the price would probably be somewhere
in the neighborhood of $45.00; if published in the East, probably $25.00, at $5.00 down and $5.00 per month; and if pubLished in Oklahoma no doubt in a "two-in-one" edition, as its
state reports are published, and sold at auction prices.
The legislative mills of the United States are turning out
laws at the estimated rate of about 18,000, biennially, according to the figures produced in the July, 1930, issue of State
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Government, (P. 2), which is very ably edited and published
by our own Senator Henry Toll, President of the American
Legislators Association. Indeed, this fact is not surprising
when one considers that there are 52 jurisdictions, each having
a separate and distinct Legislature. Enactments of the Legislatures are variously entitled: Session Laws, Codes, Amendments to the Codes, Resolves and Acts, and Acts. These different titles have no precise meaning in practice, but are generally referred to and cited simply as session laws. Books of
statutes dating from the revolutionary period to the present,
are numbered by the thousands. Indeed, I have on my desk
a volume entitled "Massachusetts Hand-List of Statutes",
published in 1912, wherein is listed all the statutes published
up to that date. This book contains 681 pages and is 7 x 10
inches. It would probably require weeks to make an accurate
count of all the statutes therein listed.
Acts of Congress are published officially and unofficially
in many forms. In addition to the advance sheets are the
"Statutes-At-Large", "Revised Statutes", "Compiled Statutes", "Federal Statutes, Annotated", "Mason's U. S. Code",
and just recently there has been completed the official "U. S.
Code, Annotated", which in my opinion, represents the last
word in statute publishing. In several of the most populous
states as many as four different series of official and unofficial
statutes are published at every session of the Legislature. Each
one has distinctive and attractive features, but the unnecessary
duplication adds to the multiplicity of law books.
The most numerous of the repositories of the law are the
court reports. Published opinions of the courts of last resort
number more than one and one-half million cases down to
1920, and fill over 12,000 volumes. Since the reign of Edward I, the opinions of Judges of the highest courts have been
recorded and treated as precedents. Lawyers, therefore, must
not only have access to all the reports of the courts of last
resort but in order that this information may be readily accessible, it is desirable that these reports be furnished the profession in advance of their official publication. Private publishers are, therefore, engaged very extensively in the publication of numerous series of unofficial reports, and there has
grown up a quadruple system of official and unofficial reports,
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reprints and annotated sets, each having certain features which
appeal to the profession.
A comprehensive table, showing the growth of American
case law, is published in a very excellent work on the subject
of legal bibliography, entitled "Methods and Materials of
Legal Research", 1923, by Frederick C. Hicks; law librarian
of Columbia University. It is therein stated that on June 30,
1922, the Columbia University Law Library contained 18,333
volumes of American reports, including all kinds of official
and unofficial sets that had theretofore been published. Whereas, the total number of English, Irish and Scotch reports in
the library on the same date was only 5,030 volumes, and there
were 3,000 volumes of British Colonial reports. He also
points out the growth of American case law, as follows: In
1801, there were S volumes; in 1848 this number had increased
to 800 volumes; in 1910 to 8,210 volumes; and in 1922 to
18,333 volumes. Note that in the period between 1910 and
1922 the increase in American Law Reports was over 10,000
volumes.
In England, all law reports are published by private publishers, whereas in the United States every jurisdiction has a
series of official law reports published by the state, in addition
to those published by private enterprise.
In 1878, a weekly journal bearing the name of "The
Sylibi" was started in St. Paul, Minnesota. It contained copies
of selected decisions of the Supreme Court of that state. In a
few months' time its name was changed to the "Northwestern
Reporter" and it was enlarged to include all Supreme Court
decisions of Minnesota, notes of Wisconsin cases, all decisions
of the Circuit Court of Minneapolis, selected cases from the
lower State Courts, and abstracts of decisions of special interest from other states. From this undertaking grew the idea
of issuing currently in one publication, all opinions as reported
by the courts in a group of adjoining states. The present
Northwestern Reporter was begun in 1879. Gradually the
reporter system was extended until in 1888 it covered the entire
United States. At the present time it consists of ten separate
units and totals over 2,000 volumes.
This National Reporter System has many attractive features. Indeed, the alert and enterprising publishers of these
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well-known reports have taken advantage of their opportunities to add many attractions not found elsewhere, which makes
their use practically indispensable to the profession. Principally, these features are: The key-number system, begun in
1908, and printed copies of many reports of courts not found
elsewhere. For example, at present, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals reports are found only in the Southwestern Reporter,
the official reports having been discontinued at volume 63, in
1911. Also the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals Reports and
the U. S. District Court Reports are now published in the
Federal Reporter and not elsewhere.
Another class of books which is increasing very rapidly
is the unofficial reports of selected cases. The first series of
annotated reports, "American Decisions", was begun in 1871,
and completed in 60 volumes. This was followed by "American Reports", in 100 volumes, and this by "American State
Reports", in 140 volumes. Due to their usefulness these annotated reports proved very popular with Bench and Bar. In
an advertisement by the publishers it was said "the reports of
the court of last resort in each state contain cases of great
general importance, but they are buried beneath a mass of
practice and local cases of no value outside the jurisdiction
in which they were decided. To remedy this evil, by separating that which is important from that which is local, is the
object of the Annotated Reports". The Trinity Series, as it
is commonly known, was followed by a somewhat similar set
of selected reports known as the Lawyers' Reports, Annotated.
The "American and English Cases Annotated", and "American Annotated Cases", largely duplicating the Lawyers' Reports, Annotated, were published during the same period
from 1911-1918. At present the current set is the American
Law Reports, which has reached 79 volumes to date.
There are several distinctive features of the current annotated reports which appeal to the lawyer: First, a careful
selection of cases of general interest from all the states; second,
the annotations which are published in connection with each
case; and third, a summary of the briefs and arguments of
counsel.
The most numerous and expensive duplications occur
within the class of books of secondary authority, which are:
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those that explain and expound the law and those that serve
as aids in finding the law; namely, Commentaries and Treatises, Encyclopedias, Dictionaries, Digests, Citators and Legal
Periodicals. To illustrate, at present, there are five different
series of Digests of the U. S. Supreme Court Reports; namely,
"American Digests", "U. S. Supreme Court Reports Digest",
"Supreme Court Reporter Digest", "Federal Reporter Digest" and "Rose's Notes". These are certainly duplications
that might have been avoided. Again, a Colorado lawyer
might have in his office at least seven different printed digests
of Colorado Reports; namely, the "Colorado Digest", "American Digest", "Advance Sheets to American Digest", "American Digests Annuals", the "Decennials", "Pacific Reporter
Digest", and "Advance Sheets to Pacific Reporter Digest",
not to mention the digests in each volume of the Colorado
Reports and the Pacific Reporter, and the encyclopedias
and text-book digests. This same situation with reference to
published digests exists in every State in the Union.
Another division of books which has multiplied until the
average law library contains thousands of volumes, is textbooks. These are: (1) the treatise or commentary, (2) the
text-book digest, (3) the student text, and (4) the local textbook. Only a small number of those of the first division mentioned, the treaty or commentary, have risen to the dignity of
primary authority, such as Blackstone's and Kent's "Commentaries", Pomeroy's "Equity Jurisprudence", Dillon's "Municipal Corporations", Wharton's "Criminal Law", etc. Some
very excellent and authoritative special treaties of recent years
are: Cardoso's "The Nature of the Judicial Process" and
"Law and Literature", Carter's "Law, Its Origin, Growth and
Function", "Modern Conception of Law", by Judge Frank
Johnston, Wigmore's "Principles of Judicial Administration", etc. The local text and the student texts are, of course,
special and limited publications. Strangely, the most numerous of this class are the text-book digests. They have no sanction or authority in law, usually consist of hastily written
briefs on some one subject or branch of the law, and are out of
date almost as soon as they are published. The only reason I
can assign for the publication of the numerous text-book digests that flood the markets, is the fact that there are a number
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of the larger libraries of unlimited budgets, which buy one
or more copies of each and every law book published, and
these, together with a very few purchasers among the lawyers,
make the undertaking profitable.
Another class of legal literature which is growing in
popularity as well as numbers is legal periodicals. It is quite
impossible for a library to acquire at this time complete files
of all law periodicals. The early numbers of practically all
the most popular of these are out of print, and even to acquire
all the available copies would be too expensive. Therefore,
the average library can carry only a selected number of the
leading periodicals, and those of local interest. In the period
between 1925 and 1930, over twenty new legal periodicals
appeared in the field. There are in all about a hundred law
magazines published in the United States. Your Supreme
Court Library contains an excellent file of this literature, together with complete indexes to all.
The United States Government is now engaged in the
publishing business in a big way. The Printing Department
at Washington is the largest establishment of its kind in the
world. It would require many days simply to read the list
of books, pamphlets and periodicals printed there every year.
Of course, only a small part of this matter could be classed
as "legal literature". Stored in the basement of our state house
here are thousands of volumes of Departmental Reports of
the U. S. Government, and also hundreds of bound volumes
of Congressional Records. These are shelved in an orderly
arrangement, and are available if required. These departmental reports are frequently cited in the opinions of the
Supreme Court of the United States and are considered a
necessary part of a complete law library.
But there are many government publications which are
absolutely necessary to any large law library and which are
available in our library in convenient arrangement, as follows:
U. S. Supreme Court Reports and Advance Parts,
I. C. C. Reports,
I. C. C. Valuation Reports,
Opinions of the Attorney General of the U. S.,
Court of Claims Reports,
Decisions of Comptroller General,
Customs and Patent Appeals Reports,
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Federal Anti-Trust Decisions,
Federal Trade Commission Decisions,
Public Lands Opinions,
Commissioner of Patents Decisions,
Board of Tax Appeals Reports, and
Treasury Decisions.

Likewise, almost every State in the Union has its own
printing establishment, or commission. Colorado is no exception. In addition to the official statutes, journals, reports
and municipal ordinances, there are 35 reports of departments
of the State, published under the supervision of the Printing
Commissioner. This does not include dozens of publications
by State institutions and other departments under their own
supervision. Of the 35 above mentioned, note the following:
Attorney General Reports,
Capitol Managers Reports,
Auditor Reports,
Dependent Children Reports,
Barber Examiners Reports,
Cosmetology Board Reports,
Board of Pharmacy Reports,
Coal Mine Inspector Reports,
Child and Animal Protection Reports, and
Agricultural Statistics Reports.

I have attempted to show that there are unnecessary duplications of books of certain classes. On the other hand, I suggest three books which are needed by the libraries and should
be published: First, a volume similar to the present National
Reporter Blue Book, listing in numerical order the Reporter
citations and showing the corresponding State Reports citations of each. The present Blue Book, as you know, lists only
the State Reports citations in numerical order and shows the
corresponding Reporter citation. Therefore, one can, with
the use of the Blue Book, easily ascertain the Reporter citation, but if he has only the Reporter, he must refer either to
the Digests or to Shepard's Citations in order to get the State
Reports citation. Second, a volume containing copies of all
the Rules of Courts of Last Resort; and third, a volume containing copies of all the State Constitutions, kept up to date
by supplements.
Our own Colorado Supreme Court Library is neither so
large nor so valuable as many others throughout the United
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States. The total number of volumes is only about 50,000
(counting those in the basement) but it contains all the books
which any member of the profession will ordinarily need in
his researches.
In the last few years I have had the pleasure of visiting
and studying the make-up and administration of several of the
largest law libraries in the United States and Europelibraries which have staffs of employees numbering as many
as 300,-including Harvard Law Library, Northwestern University Law Library, University of Illinois Library, New
York City Bar Association Library, Law Library of Congress,
Bibliotheque Nationale of France at Paris, and the League
of Nations Library at Geneva. After visiting those wonderful libraries I can say to you candidly that the Supreme Court
Library here in Denver is the cleanest, the most practicable
and the most efficient working library with which I am familiar. Your Supreme Court has given much time and effort
in making the library as complete as is possible, within the
budget alloted for its maintenance, and in making it usable,
attractive and convenient for the Colorado Bench and Bar.
In conclusion, I desire to say that I have no formula to
propose or campaign to inaugurate for the correction of this
growing evil of the bulging law library. I do feel, however,
that the constantly growing, expensive and unnecessary multiplicity of books should receive the earnest and careful consideration of the profession. It is a matter which -could be
very effectively handled by the American Bar Association,
with the cooperation of the Judicial and Legislative Departments of Governments.
An Assyrian tablet, dated in the year 2800 B. C., preserved in Constantinople, reads: "Our earth is degenerate
in these latter days; there are signs that the world is speedily
coming to an end; bribery and corruption are common; children no longer obey their parents; every man wants to write
a book, and the end of the world is evidently approaching."
The firm of Pershing, Nye, Tallmadge, Bosworth and
Dick has been dissolved. James H. Pershing, George L. Nye,
Robert G. Bosworth are continuing their partnership under
the firm name of "Pershing, Nye, Bosworth & Dick".

REPORT OF THE LEGAL AID COMMITTEE
September 13, 1932
TO THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION-:

The Legal Aid Committee of the Denver Bar Association
submits the following report of its activities:
Soon after the appointment of this Committee complaints
were received, from responsible members of the Bar, to the
effect that the Legal Aid Society of Denver, or its employees
were preparing and filing bankruptcy petitions for applicants,
who either were able to pay for legal services or should not
have imposed upon the good offices of the Legal Aid Society
by asking alms in the nature of charitable legal services.
These complaints, coupled with the fact that the committee of the Bar Association, had not met with the officials
of the Legal Aid Society for several years, made it an opportune time to confer with the Society. The Committee presented certain recommendations to the Society, through Mr.
Harry Green, its attorney, and Mr. James Pershing, its president, with the hope and thought in mind that these recommendations, if adopted, would be helpful in furthering a better
understanding between the Bar of Denver and the Legal Aid
Society.
After a thorough discussion of these matters it was concluded, at this conference, that the Society should refrain and
limit its activities, as hereinafter set forth in detail. - By so
doing the original purposes of the Legal Aid Society will be
more nearly fulfilled, and persons of financial responsibility
will learn that the Society was organized for charitable purposes and functions solely for the purposes of aiding indigent
litigants.
The Society heartily welcomed suggestions of your committee, and it was apparent to all present that Mr. Green, with
the small amount of funds available, was compelled to attempt to render services far beyond the ability of the Society.
To meet this situation the committee and the Society agreed
that it was imperative that the Society should materially limit
its services and in the future refrain from the following
activities:
1. It shall not file petitions in bankruptcy.
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2. It shall not file Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer cases; nor defend the same, unless the defendant clearly presents a meritorious and bona fide defense.
3. It shall not file nor appear in estate or probate matters.
4. It shall not file divorce suits.
S. It shall not defend litigants in divorce suits, unless
requested so to do by the Courts.
6. It shall not file nor present Industrial Relation claims
where the award may exceed one hundred dollars.
7. It shall not file suits, of any nature, where the amount
involved exceeds one hundred dollars.
8. It shall not examine abstracts of title to real estate.
9. It shall not draw wills or trust agreements.
10. It shall not do scrivener work, in connection with the
transfer or mortgaging of real or personal property.
11. It shall not accept for collection accounts in excess
of one hundred dollars.
12. It shall not represent defendants in criminal defenses.
13. It, or any of its employees, shall not engage in any
of the above prohibited activities before, during or after business hours, nor personally, directly or by indirection, receive
any compensation, or gift for services rendered or performed
from any applicant or recipient .of charitable services.
It is the intention of the Legal Aid Committee to prepare
and supervise a list of members of the Denver Bar, who may
express their willingness to represent indigent litigants, in
legal matters which may fall within the above prohibited
classifications. Litigants having such business will be referred
in rotation to Attorneys on this list. Within a few days letters
will be sent to members of the Bar asking for volunteers for
this attorneys list.
In view of the above prohibited classifications of professional services, compensation occasionally will be received by
members of this list from litigants who may have benefited
from said attorney's services. Any attorney who performs his
duties in an unsatisfactory manner to the detriment of said
litigants interest, shall have his name stricken from said attorneys list, and his services shall not be used in future matters.
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That the Committee may cooperate with the Legal Aid Society and function efficiently, all fees obtained from referred
litigants shall be reported to the Committee, together with a
resume of the services rendered.
Much thought, time and attention has been given by the
members of your Committee to this investigation and the
preparation of this report. Our work is not finished, in fact
it has just started, and your committee welcomes suggestions
from the members of the Bar in order that the Legal Aid
Society may serve the truly indigent citizens of Denver in the
proper manner.
Respectfully submitted,
THE LEGAL AID COMMITTEE,

J. F. Rotruck, Chairman,
Carl Cline,
Felder Cook,
George H. Lerg,
Stephen W. Ryan.

IN RE JURY TRIALS
RESOLVED by Judge Calvert that Section 1 of Rule
XI of the Rules of the District Court be amended to read
as follows:
"SECTION 1. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the
jury in the civil divisions shall report on the first and third
Tuesdays in the months of March, May and November; on
the third Tuesdays in the months of January and September,
and on the second Tuesdays in the months of February, April
and October."
(Above resolution carried.)
Mr. Frank N. Bancroft has resigned as Trust Officer of
The Colorado National Bank of Denver and has again entered private practice. He has resumed practice with Bartels
& Blood, the new firm name to be "Bartels, Blood and Bancroft".

DEATH AND TAXES
By Edward Miller of the Denver Bar

PANAMERICA SCROOGE was dead; as dead as the
classical doornail. That much was certain. But not so
certain was the payment of his inheritance taxes. That
was in the year 1927 after the Great War, during the Noble
Experiment, and, before the Depression Colossus.
During a long and arduous lifetime Scrooge had accumulated securities of all types including stocks, bonds, notes,
mortgages, and bank credits representing interests in many
States of the Union. Scrooge passed to realms eternal domiciled in the State of Colorado. The inheritance tax authorities in the many States immediately bestirred themselves, hoping to deduct from his estate those portions which they felt
were properly due the respective sovereignties which they
represented. Before the several States involved would permit
transfers of intangible interests they sought to impose and did
impose, taxes representing the right of succession granted to
the beneficiaries of Scrooge's bounty. They invoked the presumed prerogatives of government to seek their proper share
of the estate for the privilege and protection they gave that
estate in its growth.
Such taxes were justified upon the judicial authority of
the case of Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct.
277, 47 Lawyers' Ed. 439. In that case it was held that a deposit in a New York trust company to the credit of Blackstone, who died domiciled in Illinois, was subject to a transfer
tax imposed by the State of New York notwithstanding the
fact that the whole succession, including the New York deposit, had been similarly taxed in Illinois. Mr. Justice Holmes
who wrote the opinion appended to which appears only the
nominal dissent of Mr. Justice White, frowns upon the application of the ancient euphonious maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam. He sets forth the issue:
"Therefore the naked question is whether the State (of New York)
has the right to tax the transfer by will of such deposit."

And then to offset such immodesty he clothes the answer
in the affirmative, simply:
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"The answer is somewhat obscured by the superficial fact that New
York, like most other States, recognizes the law of the domicile as the law
determining the right of universal succession. The domicile naturally must
control a succession of that kind. Universal succession is the artificial continuance of the person of a deceased by an executor, heir, or the like so far as
succession to rights and obligations is concerned. It is a fiction, the historical
origin of which is familiar to scholars, and it is this fiction that gives whatever meaning it has to the saying mobilia sequuntur personam. But being a

fiction it is not allowed to obscure the facts when the facts become important.
To a considerable, although more or less varying, extent, the succession
determined by the law of the domicile is recognized in other jurisdictions."

That decision laid the basis for the rule that intangible
personal property could be taxed in the State where such intangibles were given birth and protected by the laws of such
State.
The general rule of Blackstone v. Miller was repeated
on numerous occasions by the United States Supreme Court
even until the recent case of Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S.
473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 Lawyers' Ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316,
decided in 1925.
In the Frick case the Supreme Court held that the estate
of Mr. Frick who had been domiciled in the State of Pennsylvania and who had owned personal property having an
actual situs in New York and Massachusetts, could not be
charged with a transfer tax imposed under a Pennsylvania
statute on the tangible personal property situated in the States
of New York and Massachusetts, and that the Pennsylvania
tax in that respect was in contravention of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Frick case fixes
definitely the rule that tangible personal property can be taxed
only in the State where it has its situs.
Subsequently the United States Supreme Court expressly
overruled the case of Blackstone v. Miller by its decision in
the case-of Farmers Loan Company v. Minnesota, 280 U. S.
204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 Lawyers' Ed. 371, 65 A. L. R. 1000.
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice McReynolds, with
Mr. Justice Holmes writing a dissenting opinion in which
Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred. The evidence in that case
showed that the decedent, Taylor, had been domiciled in New
York leaving negotiable bonds and certificates of indebtedness issued by the State of Minnesota and two of her munici-
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palities. The estate was administered in New York and the
transfer tax was paid upon the basis of the New York law.
Minnesota sought to assess an inheritance tax upon the same
transfer but the Supreme Court blocked the gesture upon the
ground that the proper situs for taxation was the State of New
York.
Seven Justices of that august body spoke as follows
through Mr. Justice McReynolds:
"Blackstone vs. Miller, supra, and certain approving opinions lend
support to the doctrine that ordinarily choses in action are subject to taxation,
both at the debtor's domicile and at the domicile of the creditor; that two
States may tax on more or less inconsistent principles the same testamentary

transfer of such property without conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The inevitable tendency of that view is to disturb good relations among the
States and produce the kind of discontent expected to subside after the establishment of the Union. The Federalist No. VII. The practical effect of it
has been bad; perhaps two-thirds of the states have endeavored to avoid the
evil by resort to reciprocal exemption laws. It has been stoutly assailed on
principle. Having reconsidered the supporting arguments in the light of our
more recent opinions, we are compelled to declare it untenable. Blackstone vs.
Miller no longer can be regarded as a correct exposition of existing law; and
to prevent misunderstanding, it is definitely overruled."

The next important case in the United States Supreme
Court involving the validity of a transfer tax upon the part
of a State not the domicile of the decedent but the State having jurisdiction over an intangible bank credit, was the case
of Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74
Lawyers' Ed. 1056, 72 A. L. R. 1303. In that case the basic
facts were that the testatrix was domiciled in Illinois at the
time of her death and had a bank deposit in the State of Missouri, and notes executed by residents of Missouri, secured by
mortgages on lands in the State of Missouri. The principle
of the Farmers Loan Company case was re-emphasized, the
Court holding that the situs of the credits and notes was at
the domicile of the testatrix and that the transfer was subject
only- to the power of the State of Illinois to tax, the property
not being within Missouri for such taxation purposes.
Shortly thereafter the United States Supreme Court was
confronted with another aspect of the same subject in the case
of Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1,
51 Sup. Ct. 54, 75 Lawyers' Ed. 131. In that case the dece-

DICTA

dent, domiciled in the State of Illinois, was the creditor of a
South Carolina corporation which was indebted to him on an
open, unsecured account appearing on the books of the corporation in South Carolina. Following the principles of the
Farmers Loan Company case the Court held that the transfer
tax could be lawfully imposed only by the State of the domicile and not by the State of South Carolina.
The last three cases definitely established the rule of the
United States Supreme Court that such intangibles as bonds,
notes and credits were subject to the imposition of an inheritance tax only by the State of the decedent's domicile, and that
this rule prevails in spite of the fact that the bonds are registered in another State and the notes secured by mortgages upon
lands situated in another State, which latter State affords the
protection and relief necessary to secure payment of the obligation.
The fundamental principles pervading the decisions
which establish the foregoing rule, rest upon the thought that
property can be transmitted from the dead to the living in
one State only, and that State must be the State of the decedent's domicile.
That was the mental outlook with which the Supreme
Court took up the recent case of First National Bank of Boston v. The State of Maine, 52 Sup. Ct. Reports 174, decided

January 4, 1932. In that case the decedent, domiciled in the
State of Massachusetts, owned stock in a Maine corporation.
The inheritance tax was paid in the State of Massachusetts.
The State of Maine sought to impose an inheritance tax upon
the stock in the Maine corporation. The Supreme Court held
that shares of stock, like other intangibles, can be constitutionally subjected to a death transfer tax by one State only and
that consequently the Maine tax was improper. The decision
,rested again upon the fictional maxim of mobilia sequuntur
personam but with a different interpretation from that of Mr.
Justice Holmes in Blackstone v. Miller. It settles definitely
a question that has been moot for many years.
Mr. Justice Sutherland, delivering the opinion of the
Court, said:
"This ancient maxim (mobilia sequuntur personam) had its origin when
personal property consisted in the main of articles appertaining to the person
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of the owner, such as gold, silver, jewels and apparel, and less immediately,
animals and products of the farm and shop. Such property was usually under
the direct supervision of the owner and was often carried about by him on his
journeys. Under these circumstances the maxim furnished the natural and
reasonable rule. In modem times due to the vast increase in the extent and
variety of tangible personal property not immediately connected with the
person of the owner, the rule has gradually yielded to the law of the place
where the property is kept and used. * * * But in respect of intangible property, the rule is still convenient and useful if not always necessary; and it has
been adhered to as peculiarly applicable to that class of property."

Mr. Justice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion supported
by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis.
Had old Pan died in 1904 immediately after the decision
in Blackstone v. Miller, his estate would have been considerably depleted because of the taxes imposed by the many States
which had sovereign jurisdiction over the corporations in
which he had stocks and over the lands upon which he had
mortgages. And upon the basis of the state of the law existing for about twenty years, Pan knew that the fruits of his
labor would be diminished by such inheritance taxes. Consequently in an attempt to save as much of the principal as
possible for his beneficiaries, he grudgingly gave them part

of his property within two years prior to his death. This was
the Move Evasive. He knew that the United States statutes
provided that such a transfer made within two years prior to
his death shall "be deemed and held to be made in contemplation of death" but he felt that he could postpone that unwished for demise until after two years had elapsed. He knew
also that the State of Colorado had passed a Statute providing
for a tax if the transfer was made in contemplation of death
and that "any transfer of property made by a person within
two years prior to death, unless shown to the contrary, shall
be deemed to have been in contemplation of death." If those
statutes were valid, only the marking of time could save the
tax.
That problem has now been settled. The United States
Supreme Court in the case of Heiner v. Donnan, 76 Lawyers'
Ed. 501, decided March 21, 1932, held the quoted portion of
the Federal Act unconstitutional on the ground that it created
a conclusive presumption which could not be overcome by
proof of the most positive character that such transfer was not
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made in contemplation of death, and that it controverted the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution in the respect that it
was a denial of due process.
The Colorado statute is not so objectionable since it permits testimony to show that the transfer was not made in contemplation of death and creates merely a rebuttable presumption.
The obvious result of the foregoing decisions is that the
law has become more definitely shaped and the uncertainty
diminished. If Pan were to die today he might be more content in the thought that only one State would tax his diversified baskets of eggs, and that he could with impunity give
away as much of his property as he pleased without the hideous thought of the Federal Estate Tax assailing him; although the ugly specter of the Colorado tax on gifts made in
contemplation of death would disturb his comfort. His spirit
would be free to revert to the simple pastoral pleasures of the
famous god from whom he took his name, no longer to be
burdened with the mobilia which no longer follow his person.
Those, and the legal principles governing the diposition thereof, he leaves to the living who might find more pleasure in
them than did he. Requiescas in pace, 0 Pan!
Myles P. Tallmage is now associated with the firm of
Dines, Dines and Holme.
Jack Garrett Scott has removed his law offices to 901
Midland Savings Bldg.
Let your speech be better than silence, or be silent.-Dionysius.

He who has learnt on solid grounds to put some value on himself, seems
to have renounced the right of undervaluing others.-Goethe.

Fame without happiness is but a sorry jest at best. What matters it to
a thirsty man if his empty cup be of gold, or silver, or of finest glass.-Ellen
Thorneycroft Fowler.

+++

Dictaphun
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SIC SEMPER TYRANIS*
The clamor of the populace cannot be denied. Four (4) readers demanded the continuance of our series of moribund Colorado bar humor.
Despite the fact that plural sufferage (sic) allowed the Editor three (3) of

those votes-in fact because of that fact-we have consented to lift a few
more of the ancient gems. The dilema lies in this: There are few more to
steal. We reserve alone for next months weary chore a story reported to us

by Judge Denison.

So be it-

No. 17-HO, HUMI
Our spies report that from the organization of the State until 1881 (five
years--count 'em) Thomas M. Bowen was judge of the Fourth District.
Mining had enriched him and a term or two in Congress was also his lot.
In Washington he received letters from his constituents and others, soliciting
aid for this and the other. An Arizona cemetery, it is charged, wrote him for
$500 for a fence around the local God's acre. To which the ornament of
statecraft replied: "I do not see the necessity for a fence around the cemetery. It has been my observation that those on the outside do not want in,
and those on the inside cannot get out."
And likely he concluded: "If at any other time I can be of service to
you, do not hesitate to command me." And sent it under frank.

No. 18-TIME PROVES WISDOM TO BE SUCH
Shortly after the Cleveland (Harrison to Democrats) panic, the Denver
Bar Association was organized under, and, so it is said, by virtue of the laws
of the State of Colorado. No qualification for membership was found in the
articles and upon the occasion of the first meeting serious debate was had upon
the right of those present to become members. George C. (Dean) Manly
(Senator to you) moved that by-laws defining the properties to be had by
members be adopted and a committee be appointed to pass upon applications,
including those present. S. S. (Sunset) Cox of Ohio's (Cox's of Ohio) Red
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Headed Rooster of the Rockies, viz., James B. Belford, rose and shouted: "I
protest, I protest. When our forefathers established this government at Plymouth Rock, they did not hesitate to announce the pronunciamento to the
whole world, 'We are the Saints!' " And so, on second of the late T. E.
'Watters, Mr. Manly's "Preposterous" suggestion was tabled.
Everyone became a charter member-except Manly! He is now a member.

No. 19-STATE BOARD v. MILLER, 90 COLO. 193
Jacob Fillius, now of the Denver Bar, was first mayor of Georgetown.
The charter of that city was granted by Congress itself and provided, inter
alia, that the mayor should be also the magistrate.
As a maxim of jurisprudence Judge Fillius pronounced a fine of $10 and
costs ($8) for the offense of drunkeness. There was no court held on Sunday
and His Honor objected to being awakened on Saturday nights. Hence he
arranged with the Marshal that offenders against sobriety and the ordinance in
such cases made and provided be freed upon deposit with the Marshal of $18,
thus relieving them of imprisonment over Sunday and allowing them the joyful
prospect of going to work early on Monday. Monday mornings, when court
convened, the Marshal would account for an arrest in the shape of a prisoner
or cash, $18.
One Monday the Marshal was charged with four arrests. He produced
$54 and no prisoner; also one set of false teeth. In response to the demanded
explanation the Marshal averred that an arrested miner had no money and
had deposited his removable molars as hostage.
And about noon (the honest Marshal!) the teeth were redeemed and
Georgetown got the $18.

No. 20-NOR FROM NEWSPAPERS?
In the dear, dead days when the Rush Bill (XXth Amendment to you
neophytes) was before the Supreme Court, Judge Hallett took particular
pleasure in refusing to recognize verifications by notaries public of the City
and County of Denver. Truth was, he didn't like notaries anyway. The
day (wonder to behold) that the Supreme Court reversed itself and held the
amendment to be valid, Theodore H. Thomas, of revered memory, presented
a petition for discharge of a bankrupt, sworn to before one of Hallett's betes
noires.
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Hallett: Mr. Thomas, your petition is obnoxious to the objection it is
sworn to before an officer not authorized to administer an oath.
Thomas: Your honor, the newsboys are shouting that the Supreme
Court has sustained the constitutionality of the amendment this morning. I
hear them crying the news through the window. Does not the Court?
Hallett: This Court does not take its law from newsboys, Sir!

No. 21-THIS HAPPENED TO BEN SWEET
IN LATER DAYS
Before Hallett, J. Augustus H. Martin, of counsel for orator.
Hizzoner: Mr. Martin, your bill lacks weight.
Martin: May it please the Court, I am confident I have stated a cause
of action. Etc., etc., Martin proceeding at great length to sustain his position;
the Court, as usual, hearing the presentation with the utmost patience, as was
the custom of the judge. And, after fifteen minutes, when Martin had argued
jurisdiction, ultimate fact and lawHallett: Your bill lacks weight, sir. It does not weigh at least 14
pounds to the ream, sir, as required by the rule of this Court.

No. 22-SO BOWEN BECAME A U. S. SENATOR
The late Chief Justice Charles D. Hayt and Elijah J. Hamm, both good
friends of Judge Thomas M. Bowen and, as a consequence, subject to the
exercise of Bowen's ready wit, were trying a case before Bowen. A Mexican
juror asked to be excused. "Me no understan' good inglis," said the Mexican.
"Oh," said Judge Bowen, "that's all right; neither Mr. Hayt nor Mr. Hamm
speak good English."

No. 23-TRUE, BROTHER
In Cheesman v. Shreeve, 40 Fed. 796, Phillips, J., remarked: "There
must be something in the altitude of that (Battle) mountain, or in the depth
of its mines, wonderfully prolific of falsifiers and orators." And, after the
trial: "The witnesses in this case in the order of their ability at prevarication
are to be classified as liars, damned liars and expert witnesses."

HOLD YOUR BREATH UNTIL THE NOVEMBER
ISSUE-WE KNOW YOU HOPE WE DO.

(EDITOR'S NorE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of a filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC DOMAIN RANGE-CONSTRUCTION

-EVIDENCE-Rex

OF ACT

Barrow, et al., vs. J. L. Wilcoxson, et al.,--No. 12830

-Decided September 12, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. Where a group of cattlemen brought an action against several sheepmen to apportion and divide the use of a certain range on the Public Domain,
and the proceedings were conducted under the provisions of Chapter 125,
Session Laws, 1929, pursuant to the findings of referees; and the District
Court designated a certain portion as cattle range and another part as sheep
range, and granted injunctive relief. The Act was construed in conjunction
with Allen v. Bailey as being Constitutional.
2. Instructions of the lower Court to the referees, to the effect that in
determining the rights of the parties in or to a mixed range, consideration
should be given not only to the use made thereof during the grazing season
prior to the passage of the 1929 Act, but also for a reasonable period of time
prior thereto to the end that the referees might determine which class of livestock growers first used said range or any part thereof, were not error. Objections enlarged upon in the Assignment of Error beyond instructions that
the Trial Court might have changed if it had been given an opportunity to do
so at the proper time, are not considered.
3. Where the evidence is conflicting upon the subject of how many
years back the referees should have gone in determining the use of the range,
the usual rule in such cases applies.
4. Where the findings of the referees and lower court were based upon
conflicting evidence, and priority of use and occupation was employed in the
determination of possessory rights, and evidence of unanimity and thoroughness
of the referees's work as well as that of the District Court and respective
counsel was shown, the judgment is just and equitable.-Judgment affirmed.

PROCEEDINGS-J. H.
Jouflos, et al., vs. R. H. Pitchford,et al.,-No. 13134-Decided September
12, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. Where the District Court decreed an apportionment and division of
a certain public range in Moffat County, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 125, Session Laws, 1929, and later supplementary proceedings were
brought under section 6 of the same act, but evidence was not preserved by
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EVIDENCE-SUPPLEMENTARY
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Bill of Exceptions; it was assumed that the same was sufficient to support the
decree.
2. In such case such statute was held constitutional on grounds similar
to those presented in No. 12881, Allen vs. Bailey.-Judgment affirmed.

DIVORCE MANDAMUS TO COMPEL COURT TO ISSUE DECREE-Laizure vs.

Baker, Judge of County Court, et al.-Decided Sept. 12, 1932 -Opinion
by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Can the guilty party in a divorce action maintain mandamus to
compel to court to enter a final decree in favor of, and over the protest of the
innocent party, after the passage of six months from the entry of the findings
of fact; or compel the court to issue a certificate that the parties are in fact
divorced? HELD. Plaintiff relies on chap. 91 p. 327 L. 1929. without deciding the constitutionality of this act, if it be valid, the findings of fact shall
set forth that after six months from their entry, unless certain specified action
is taken, they shall operate as a decree of divorce upon the terms therein set
forth; no further action need be taken by the court.
2. Since no further action need be taken by the Court, unless he exercises his discretion in issuing a final decree, mandamus will not lie to compel a
court to exercise discretion.
JUSTICE COURTS--SUMMONS-APPEALS---W'AIVER

OF

DEFECT IN

SUM-

MONS--Fort vs. Demmer-Decded Sept. 12, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice lter.
1. Summons issued out of Justice Court, returnable in four days instead of time provided by sec. 6376 C. L. 1921 is invalid, but this defect may
be waived by defendants appearance in court.
2. In a proceeding under the unlawful detainer act, in Justice Court, if
defendant fails to file her answer no issue is raised, hence none to be tried, and
default will enter.
3. In an appeal from the Justice to the County Court if the appeal bond
is not filed within the time specified by law, the County Court has no jurisdiction.
ATTACHMENT-INTERVENING

CREDITOR-TIME

ALLOWED--JURISDICTION

Denver Transfer and Storage Company et al. vs. Baylor et al.-No. 13,158---Decided September 12, 1932.-Opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Adams.
1. Sec. 6096, C. L. 1921, allowing creditors twenty days after the return day in which to intervene in an attachment proceeding in the justice court,
amounts to a statute of limitation.
2. In such a proceeding, where a claim which exceeded the jurisdiction
of the justice court, was filed after the expiration of said twenty day period,
such claim was void as to the plaintiff and other attaching creditors, and left
nothing for the Justice to certify to the County Court under Sec. 6099, C. L.
1921.--Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
OF JuSTiCE--North
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DICTA

APPEAL BON>--APPRoVAL-Zimmerman vs. Combs et al.-No. 13,115-

Decided September 12, 1932.-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.

1. On appeal from the County to the District Court, an appeal bond
is sufficient if actually, although not formally, approved within the time limited by statute. This is so even though the Judge of the County Court, after

the expiration of such time, suggests the advisability of obtaining another
surety, and, that having been done, then indorses his approval on the bond as
of such later date.-Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

TAXES-TAx

SALES-REFUNDS-County Commissioners of Washington
County vs. Lauington-No. 12704-Decided September 12, 1932.-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Plaintiff purchased land at a tax sale. He later petitioned for a refund, claiming the sale was illegal. The land in question was originally
platted. The only attempt to vacate the plat was a resolution of the County
Commissioners. In due time, plaintiff obtained a tax deed. The lower
Court awarded the plaintiff his refund and the Commissioners appealed.
2. In absence of a special statute, the purchaser at a tax sale buys at his
peril. The Colorado statutes providing for refunds are:
(a)
Where no tax was due at the time of the sale.
(b) Where the tax was illegal or erroneous.
3. Under such facts, as above outlined, the plaintiff does not come
within either of the refunding statutes. The contention that the plaintiff
bought acreage and that the tax due was upon lots is unsound. The fact that
the tax was due and that he paid it is unaffected by mere method of description; so too is the contention unsound that the streets and alleys, dedicated to
the public by plat, could not be taxed but that they were sold to him, there
having been no statutory dedication of these streets and alleys. The section
of the statute, which provides that an illegal or erroneous tax shall be returned to the taxpayer, is expressly limited to taxpayers and has no application
to tax ptirchasers.-Judgment reversed.
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